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This article uses the data of the 2002 national census and a comprehensive dataset of the
December 2003–March 2008 regional legislative elections in Russia to assess the levels of
the representation of ethnic Muslims in the regional legislative assemblies. The study
reveals that the overall pattern of the representation of ethnic Muslims in Russia’s regional
legislative assemblies is not monotonous. Ethnic Muslims are signiﬁcantly overrepresented
in those republics where they are ‘titular’ nationalities; they tend to be underrepresented
in a group of regions with signiﬁcant ethnic Muslim minorities; but as their share in the
overall population goes down, the picture becomes more balanced, so that it would be fair
to say that small Muslim minorities are quite well represented. The article explains the
observed patterns with reference to the logic of non-politicization of cleavages shared by
all types of regions. For the ruling elites of Muslim-majority republics, the preferred mode
of operation is to keep the overrepresentation of Muslims as a characteristic of all political
groups who can realistically claim access to power. For the predominantly Russian elites of
regions with signiﬁcant ethnic Muslim minorities, the non-politicization of cleavages is
a way to make electoral appeals to wider general population. In the regions with small
ethnic Muslim minorities, their entry into political arenas is conditional on individual or
group alliances with locally dominant elite groups, without any articulation of ethnicity/
religion cleavages whatsoever.
Copyright  2012, Asia-Paciﬁc Research Center, Hanyang University. Production and
hosting by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
The political standing of any societal group depends
heavily on the levels of representation attained by thisarch Center, Hanyang
sia-Paciﬁc Research Center, Hagroup in the existing bodies of government. While the
theory of mirror representation may not catch all the
normative desiderata of liberal democracy, on the one hand,
and may be misleading as a guide for an empirical assess-
ment of democratic institutions, on the other hand (Burdess
and O’Toole, 2004; Prewitt & Eulau, 1969), it is nevertheless
clear that for the voice of a group to be heard, adequate
representation is highly desirable. At the same time, under-
representation, if at a signiﬁcant scale, may cause political
frustration, alienation, and reliance upon non-systemic
ways of political advocacy (Hewitt, 1981). The purpose of
this article is to empirically assess the level of correspon-
dence between the shares of ethnic Muslims in the overall
population of Russia’s regions and their salience in regionalnyang University. Production and hosting by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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legislative assemblies. In fact, after direct gubernatorial
elections were abolished in 2005 (Goode, 2007), legislative
assemblies remained the only elected region-level ofﬁce in
Russia, and their political signiﬁcance increased to an
extent after gubernatorial elections were replaced with
governors’ appointment by the president of Russia pending
on conﬁrmation by a majority vote in the assembly.
Governors are by far the most important players in Russia’s
regional politics. Yet the powers of the assemblies are not
symbolic in such policy domains as general legislation, sub-
national taxation, and budgeting (Golosov, 2004). Hence it
is for a good reason that assembly seats are highly valued by
Russia’s regional elites, asmanifested by the process of ‘elite
colonization’ of the assemblies that started as early as in the
ﬁrst half of the 1990s (Golosov, 1997; Slider, 1996). Corre-
spondingly, the symbolic and practical implications of
group representation in these bodies are signiﬁcant.
The analysis consists of three sections. In the ﬁrst
section, I investigate the proportions made by ethnic
Muslims in the overall population of the Russian Federation
and in its individual regions. By ethnic Muslims, I under-
stand populations belonging to those ethnic groups who
are Muslim by tradition. No claim is made that ethnicity
automatically entails religious commitments. At the same
time, I ﬁnd it apparent that whatever the current levels of
religious activity are, the cultural background creates
a certain level of communality among ethnic Muslims, and
may be conducive to speciﬁc organizational and ideological
patterns of political activity. In the second section, I assess
the levels of political representation of ethnic Muslims in
regional legislative assemblies, for which end basic factual
information about these institutions is provided, and an
empirical assessment is made. In the third section, I deepen
my inquiry by bringing into the picture the role of indi-
vidual political parties as agencies of ethnic Muslims’
representation in Russia, and provide an overall explana-
tory model. The methodological tools and sources used for
solving these tasks are characterized in the corresponding
sections.
2. How many ethnic Muslims are there in the regions
of Russia?
Despite the obvious simplicity of the question, it poses
an empirical problem. Even the assessments of the share of
ethnic Muslims in contemporary Russia’s population run
wide from about 10 percent to nearly 20 percent. In fact,
the published results of the 2002 national census provide
all the necessary and sufﬁcient raw data, but some addi-
tional effort to aggregate them at the regional level is in
order, which I do in this section of the article. This, in turn,
requires some elementary factual information about how
ethnicity was dealt with by the organizers of the 2002
census.
In all censuses previously held in the Soviet Union, the
respondents had to choose their nationality from lists
provided by the interviewers (Karklins, 1980; Taagepera,
1971). These lists varied quite signiﬁcantly from one
census to another, depending on the sometimes erratic
dynamics of Soviet nationality politics and of the academythat followed these twists. In 2002, for the ﬁrst time, the
respondents were free to decide how to identify their
ethnicity, and whether to reveal it at all (Heleniak, 2003). In
fact, slightly more than 1 percent of all respondents chose
not to report their nationality. A very small portion of the
respondents, 0.03 percent, did report it, but the nationali-
ties reported by them were very rare, unusual, or simply
imagined, such as Elves or Hobbits. Yet for as many as 98.9
percent of the respondents, reporting their ethnicity was
not problematic, and their reported identiﬁcations ﬁt into
142 categories identiﬁed by census organizers. The break-
down of the overall population by these categories was
published both for the country as awhole and for individual
regions. By regions, I conventionally understand the 89 sub-
national units, ofﬁcially referred to as ‘federation subjects’,
that existed in Russia in 2002: 21 republics, 6 territories, 49
provinces, 2 federal cities, 1 autonomous province, and 10
autonomous districts. Of them, the republics, the autono-
mous province, and the autonomous districts were the
residua of the Soviet-time nationality politics, for they had
been created as homelands for their ‘titular nationalities’,
while other units were simply territorial (Hazard, 1971).
According to the 1993 Constitution of Russia, all regions are
equal in their standing vis-à-vis the Federation, even
though all but one autonomous districtswere parts of larger
regions, territories or provinces. This constitutional ambi-
guity was solved in different ways at different phases of
Russia’s political development (Hanson, 2006).
To fulﬁll the goal ofmy empirical inquiry, it was essential
to differentiate the set of 142 nationalities into two broader
analytical categories, Muslims and non-Muslims. Upon
investigating each of the ethnic groups, I found this task
generally unproblematic, because the empirical boundary
between these categories is not blurred to any signiﬁcant
extent. While it is true that small Muslim minorities exist
among traditionally non-Muslim ethnic groups (such as the
Laz among Georgians), and vice versa (such as Kryashens
among Tatars), such minorities are small. This allowed me
to characterize quite unambiguously 43 groups as ethnic
Muslim (listed below), and 99 as non-Muslim.
The ﬁrst ﬁnding revealed by my empirical inquiry was
that the share of ethnicMuslims in the overall population of
Russia is often overestimated. According to the 2002
national census, they constituted 9.93 percent of the pop-
ulation. Table 1 lists the ethnic Muslim groups of Russia in
the descending order of their numeric sizes. An additional
piece of informationprovided in the table refers to the shares
of ethnic Muslim populations residing in their ethnic
homelands, republics. This information is useful for the
assessment of the territorial dispersion of ethnic Muslins, as
well as of some political aspects to be discussed below.
Twelve groups (Crimean Tatars, Dunguns, Karakalpaks,
Khemshils, Meskhetin Turks, Middle-Asian Arabs, Middle-
Asian Gipsies, Persians, Shapsugs, Talysh, Tats, Uyghurs),
each of them constituting less then 0.01 percent of the
overall population, are joined together under the rubric of
Others. It is important to note that for all other calculations
reported in this study, they were counted separately. The
republic of Dagestan is ofﬁcially a homeland for 10 groups
(Aguls, Avars,Dargins, Kumyks, Laks, Lezghins,Nogai, Rutuls,
Tabasarans, and Tsakhurs), none of which constituting
Table 1









Share of the overall
population of the
region where this
group Is a ‘titular
nationality’, percent
Tatars 5,554,601 3.83 36.01
Bashkirs 1,673,389 1.15 72.98
Chechens 1,360,253 0.94 75.84
Avars 814,473 0.56 93.12
Kazakhs 653,962 0.45 N/a
Azerbaijani 621,840 0.43 N/a
Kabardinians 519,958 0.36 95.91
Dargins 510,156 0.35 83.41
Kumyks 422,409 0.29 86.60
Ingush 413,016 0.28 87.42
Lezghins 411,535 0.28 81.82
Karachai 192,182 0.13 88.04
Laks 156,545 0.11 89.26
Tabasarans 131,785 0.09 83.58
Adygei 128,528 0.09 84.12
Uzbeks 122,916 0.08 N/a
Tajiks 120,136 0.08 N/a
Balkarians 108,426 0.07 96.80
Turks 92,415 0.06 N/a
Nogai 90,666 0.06 42.10
Cirkassians 60,517 0.04 81.95
Abazins 37,942 0.03 N/a
Turkmen 33,053 0.02 N/a
Kirghiz 31,808 0.02 N/a
Rutuls 29,929 0.02 81.19
Aguls 28,297 0.02 82.39
Kurds 19,607 0.01 N/a
Abkhazians 11,366 0.01 N/a
Arabs 10,630 0.01 N/a
Tsakhurs 10,366 0.01 78.80
Afghans 9800 0.01 N/a
Others 26,789 0.02 N/a
Source: calculated by the author from the ofﬁcial 2002 census data, http://
www.perepis2002.ru/index.html?id¼17, accessed in January through 7
December 2011.
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are homelands for two groups each, Balkarians and Kabar-
dinians, and Cirkassians and Karachai, respectively. Thus of
the 31 groups forwhich the data are given in the table,19 do
have their ethnic homelands in the Russian Federation, even
though some of them are shared, while the remaining 12,
with the only exception of Abazins, have their majorities
residing in foreign countries. This means that the Soviet-
time nationality politics were quite efﬁcient in supplying
every signiﬁcant ethnic Muslim group with its own
‘statehood’.
As follows from the data, the vast majority of ethnic
Muslim populations of Russia reside mostly in those
regions where they are ‘titular nationalities’. The most
salient exception is, of course, provided by Tatars. While
Tatars are by far the largest ethnic Muslim group in Russia,
almost two thirds of them live outside of their ethnic
homeland, Tatarstan. Then it is not surprising that Tatars
constitute the largest ethnic Muslim minorities in the vas
majority of Russia’s regions. Yet it is also important to note
that a large part of Tatars live in a neighboring republic,
Bashkortostan. The data on the ethnic compositions of the
Russian regions are provided in Table 2. The regions arelisted in the descending order of the percentage shares of
their ethnic Muslim populations. Individual ethnic groups
are listed only if they constitute more than 1 percent of the
overall population. However, the largest ethnic Muslim
minorities are listed irrespective of their relative size. The
words ‘autonomous district’ are abbreviated to AD, and
‘autonomous province’, to AP.
As follows from the table, in only seven regions of Russia
ethnic Muslims constitute outright majorities, running
from 53.99 percent in Tatarstan to 98.13 percent in
Ingushetia. All these regions are republics created as
homelands for ethnic Muslim groups. Of these regions,
Russians are in plurality only in Bashkortostan where the
‘titular’ Muslim nationality is almost matched by Tatars.
Then follows a group of eight regions where ethnic
Muslims form signiﬁcant pluralities, over than 10 percent.
Only one of them, Adygeya, is a republic, which makes it
closer to the ﬁrst cluster of regions. There, the ‘titular’
nationality yields in size to Russians. In the remaining
regions of this category, the largest ethnic Muslim groups
are Tatars or, in Astrakhan province, Kazakhs. Bashkirs and
Azerbaijani are also visibly present. In twelve regions,
ethnic Muslims form from 5 to 10 percent of the pop-
ulation. In the remaining 62 regions, the shares of ethnic
Muslim populations are smaller than 5 percent, which
makes them small minorities.
3. How many ethnic Muslims are there in regional
legislative assemblies?
In the vast majority of regions, with an exception of
several republics, information about the ethnicity of the
elected deputies, not to say about all candidates running in
elections, is neither collected nor publicly reported. Thus
the census-like data about the ethnic compositions of
regional legislative assemblies are not available. At the
same time, information about ethnicity can be easily
inferred from an essential piece of information that is
naturally reported as a part of the available electoral
statistics, the names of candidates and elected deputies.
The ofﬁcial way of reporting names in Russia is to include
three components, the ﬁrst name, the patronymic name,
and the last (family) name. In theory, candidates may
abstain from reporting their patronymics, but in practice,
very few choose to do that. Fortunately from the point of
view of this research, the impact of Islam on the personal
names of Russian citizens is visible enough to make ethnic
Muslims easily distinguishable from those who are, in their
collective backgrounds, Christians (as the majority of Rus-
sia’s nationalities), Buddhists (as Buryats or Kalmyks), or
Jews. There are only two signiﬁcant exceptions: Ossetians,
who cannot be easily distinguished by their names from
the surrounding Islamic groups, and Altai, who are mostly
Christian, yet their names are often similar to the names of
Kazakhs who are signiﬁcantly present in their ‘titular’
region, Altai Republic. This made me exclude two regions,
North Ossetia and Altai Republic, from further inquiry.
The practical criterion for including individual candi-
dates into the category of ethnic Muslims was thus:
I included only those for whom at least two of the three
components of the name indicated ethnic Muslim origins.
Table 2
Ethnic Muslims in the populations of Russia’s regions.
Region Share of ethnic Muslim
population, percent
Largest non-Muslim groups (percent of the
overall population)
Largest Muslim groups (percent of the
overall population)
Ingushetia 98.13 Russians 1.19 Ingush 77.27, Chechens 20.42
Chechnya 95.87 Russians 3.68 Chechens 93.47
Dagestan 94.66 Russians 4.69 Avars 29.44, Dargins 16.52, Kumyks 14.20,
Lezghins 13.07, Laks 5.42, Azerbaijani 4.33,
Tabasarans 4.28, Chechens 3.41, Nogai 1.48
Kabardino-Balkaria 70.50 Russians 25.14, Ossetians 1.09 Kabardinians 53.33, Balkarians 11.64
Karachevo-Cherkesia 62.92 Russians 33.65 Karachai 38.50, Cirkassians 11.28,
Abazins 7.36, Nogai 3.38
Bashkortostan 54.44 Russians 36.32, Chuvashs 2.86, Mari 2.58,
Ukrainians 1.35
Bashkirs 29.76, Tatars 24.14
Tatarstan 53.99 Russians 39.50, Chuvashs 3.35 Tatars 52.92
Adygeya 27.00 Russians 64.48, Armenians 3.41, Ukrainians 2.03 Adygei 24.18
Astrakhan 25.59 Russians 69.69, Ukrainians 1.25 Kazakhs 14.19, Tatars 7.02
Orenburg 16.75 Russians 73.94, Ukrainians 3.53, Mordovians 2.41 Tatars 7.61, Kazakhs 5.76, Bashkirs 2.42
Khanty-Mansi AD 15.53 Russians 66.06, Ukrainians 8.60, Belorussians 1.43,
Khanty 1.20, Chuvashs 1.07
Tatars 7.51, Bashkirs 2.50, Azerbaijani 1.75
Ulyanovsk 13.04 Russians 72.65, Chuvashs 8.05, Mordovians 3.63,
Ukrainians 1.13
Tatars 12.20
Tyumen 12.92 Russians 71.57, Ukrainians 6.47, Belorussians 1.10 Tatars 7.42, Bashkirs 1.43, Azerbaijani 1.30
Chelyabinsk 11.89 Russians 82.31, Ukrainians 2.14 Tatars 5.69, Bashkirs 4.62, Kazakhs 1.01
Yamalo-Nenets AD 11.56 Russians 58.85, Ukrainians 13.03, Nentsy 5.21,
Belorussians 1.77, Khanty 1.73, Komi 1.22,
Moldavians 1.07
Tatars 5.47, Azerbaijani 1.65, Bashkirs 1.56
Kalmykia 9.88 Kalmyks 53.33, Russians 33.55, Dargins 2.49, Chechens 2.04,
Kazakhs 1.71, Turks 1.07
Udmurtia 7.69 Russians 60.12, Udmurts 29.33 Tatars 6.96
North Ossetia 7.46 Ossetians 62.70, Russians 23.19, Armenians 2.41,
Georgians 1.52
Ingush 3.02, Kumyki 1.78
Stavropol 6.97 Russians 81.60, Armenians 5.46, Ukrainians 1.68,
Greeks 1.25
Dargins 1.47
Saratov 6.92 Russians 85.94, Ukrainians 2.52 Kazakhs 2.94, Tatars 2.16
Perm 6.80 Russians 85.18, KP 3.67 Tatars 4.84, Bashkirs 1.44
Omsk 6.75 Russians 83.47, Ukrainians 3.75, Germans 3.67 Kazakhs 3.93, Tatars 2.30
Altai Republic 6.70 Russians 57.41, Altai 30.64, Telengits 1.17 Kazakhs 5.97
Marii El 6.36 Russians 47.46, Mari 42.88, Chuvashs 1.02 Tatars 5.96
Penza 6.33 Russians 86.35, Mordovians 4.87 Tatars 5.97
Samara 5.64 Russians 83.60, Chuvashs 3.13, Mordovians 2.65,
Ukrainians 1.87
Tatars 3.95
Mordovia 5.48 Russians 60.84, Mordovians 31.94 Tatars 5.21
Kurgan 5.47 Russians 91.47, Ukrainians 1.10 Tatars 2.05, Bashkirs 1.50, Kazakhs 1.45
Sverdlovsk 5.41 Russians 89.23, Ukrainians 1.24 Tatars 3.75
Volgograd 4.58 Russians 88.89, Ukrainians 2.09 Kazakhs 1.68, Tatars 1.06
Moscow City 3.87 Russians 84.83, Ukrainians 2.44, Armenians 1.20 Tatars 1.60
Ust-Ordynskii Buryat 3.36 Russians 54.42, Buryats 39.64 Tatars 3.03
Kirov 3.26 Russians 90.82, Mari 2.59, Udmurts 1.19 Tatars 2.89
Tomsk 3.13 Russians 90.84, Ukrainians 1.60, Germans 1.29 Tatars 1.93
Komi 3.04 Russians 59.59, Komi 25.18, Ukrainians 6.10,
Belorussians 1.49
Tatars 1.54
Taimyr AD 3.03 Russians 58.61, Dolgans 13.87, Nenets 17.68,
Ukrainians 6.09, Nganasans 1.93, Germans 1.48
Tatars 1.07
Krasnoyarsk 2.98 Russians 88.95, Ukrainians 2.31, Germans 1.24 Tatars 1.50
Chuvashia 2.98 Chuvashs 67.69, Russians 26.53, Mordovians 1.22 Tatars 2.77
Kemerovo 2.64 Russians 91.92, Ukrainians 1.30, Germans 1.24 Tatars 1.76
Magadan 2.55 Russians 80.18, Ukrainians 9.89, Evens 1.38,
Belorussians 1.19
Tatars 1.10
Sakha (Yakutia) 2.55 Yakuts 45.54, Russians 41.15, Ukrainians 3.65,
Evenks 1.92, Evens 1.23
Tatars 1.13
Rostov 2.55 Russians 89.35, Ukrainians 2.69, Armenians 2.50 Turks 0.64
Evenki AD 2.24 Russians 61.92, Evenks 21.48, Yakuts 5.60,
Ukrainians 3.11, Kets 1.19
Tatars 0.92
Novosibirsk 2.15 Russians 93.01, Germans 1.76, Ukrainians 1.26 Tatars 1.04
Krasnodar 2.14 Russians 86.56, Armenians 5.36, Ukrainians 2.57 Tatars 0.50
Murmansk 2.06 Russians 85.25, Ukrainians 6.37, Belorussians 2.28 Tatars 0.89
Kamchatka 2.05 Russians 80.85, Ukrainians 5.82, Koreans 2.04 Tatars 1.01
Sakhalin 1.98 Russians 84.28, Koreans 5.41, Ukrainians 3.99 Tatars 1.25
Irkutsk 1.93 Russians 89.88, Buryats 3.12, Ukrainians 2.08 Tatars 1.20
Nizhny Novgorod 1.88 Russians 94.96 Tatars 1.44
Chukotka 1.87 Russians 51.87, Chukchi 23.45, Ukrainians 9.22,
Eskimo 2.85, Evens 2.61, Chuvashs 1.77
Tatars 0.99
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Table 2 (continued )
Region Share of ethnic Muslim
population, percent
Largest non-Muslim groups (percent of the
overall population)
Largest Muslim groups (percent of the
overall population)
St. Petersburg 1.66 Russians 84.73, Ukrainians 1.87, Belorussians 1.17 Tatars 0.76
Khakasia 1.63 Russians 80.28, Khakass 11.98, Germans 1.68,
Ukrainians 1.53
Tatars 0.73
Khabarovsk 1.61 Russians 89.82, Ukrainians 3.38 Tatars 0.76
Koryak 1.53 Russians 50.56, Koryaks 26.27, Chukchi 5.61,
Itelmen 4.69, Ukrainians 4.09, Evens 2.99
Tatars 0.86
Jewish AP 1.47 Russians 89.93, Ukrainians 4.44, Jews 1.22 Tatars 0.63
Tver 1.45 Russians 92.49, Ukrainians 1.53 Tatars 0.46
Ivanovo 1.44 Russians 93.69 Tatars 0.71
Moscow Province 1.44 Russians 91.00, Ukrainians 2.23 Tatars 0.80
Amur 1.43 Russians 92.04, Ukrainians 3.49 Tatars 0.54
Primorsky Territory 1.42 Russians 89.89, Ukrainians 4.54 Tatars 0.70
Buryatia 1.37 Russians 67.82, Buryats 27.81 Tatars 0.83
Chita 1.36 Russians 89.80, Buryats 6.10, Ukrainians 1.03 Tatars 0.71
KalinIngushrad 1.31 Russians 82.37, Belorussians 5.31,
Ukrainians 4.94, Lithuanians 1.46
Tatars 0.50
Yaroslavl 1.28 Russians 95.15 Tatars 0.45
Leningrad 1.26 Russians 89.58, Ukrainians 2.51,
Belorussians 1.58
Tatars 0.57
Altai Territory 1.24 Russians 91.97, Germans 3.05,
Ukrainians 2.02
Kazakhs 0.38
Kaluga 1.23 Russians 93.47, Ukrainians 2.22 Tatars 0.41
Ryazan 1.19 Russians 94.59, Ukrainians 1.03 Tatars 0.45
Orel 1.18 Russians 95.32, Ukrainians 1.30 Azerbaijani 0.25
Tula 1.17 Russians 95.21, Ukrainians 1.33 Tatars 0.54
Vladimir 1.09 Russians 94.74, Ukrainians 1.10 Tatars 0.57
Belgorod 1.07 Russians 92.88, Ukrainians 3.83 Azerbaijani 0.30
Nenets AD 1.07 Russians 62.44, Nenets 18.66, Komi 10.86,
Ukrainians 3.16, Belorussians 1.03
Tatars 0.51
Novgorod 1.07 Russians 93.92, Ukrainians 1.50 Tatars 0.30
Komi-Permyak AD 1.01 Komi-Permyaks 59.03, Russians 38.17 Tatars 0.81
Kostroma 0.98 Russians 95.58, Ukrainians 1.09 Tatars 0.37
Aginskii Buryat AD 0.96 Buryats 62.52, Russians 35.13 Tatars 0.54
Karelia 0.95 Russians 76.64, Karelians 9.17,
Belorussians 5.26, Ukrainians 2.69, Finns 1.98
Tatars 0.37
Voronezh 0.84 Russians 94.15, Ukrainians 3.10 Azerbaijani 0.18
Smolensk 0.82 Russians 93.38, Ukrainians 1.65,
Belorussians 1.55
Tatars 0.23
Tyva 0.81 Tuvinians 77.02, Russians 20.11 Tatars 0.19
Lipetsk 0.78 Russians 95.82, Ukrainians 1.10 Azerbaijani 0.28
Tambov 0.78 Russians 96.47 Tatars 0.23
Pskov 0.70 Russians 94.25, Ukrainians 1.64,
Belorussians 1.27
Tatars 0.20
Arkhangelsk 0.69 Russians 94.19, Ukrainians 2.08 Tatars 0.25
Kursk 0.65 Russians 95.87, Ukrainians 1.69 Azerbaijani 0.16
Vologda 0.60 Russians 96.56 Azerbaijani 0.21
Bryansk 0.44 Russians 96.34, Ukrainians 1.47 Azerbaijani 0.17
Source: calculated by the author from the ofﬁcial 2002 census data, http://www.perepis2002.ru/index.html?id¼17, accessed in January through 7 December
2011.
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Muslim ﬁrst and patronymic names, a combination espe-
cially widespread among women candidates, was included,
but if only the patronymic name was Muslim, she was dis-
counted. Of course, this method obviously entails
individual-level mistakes. To compensate for that, I used
a very large database of candidates who ran in all Russia’s
regional legislative elections fromDecember 2003 toMarch
2008. In addition to North Ossetia and Altai Republic, the
database does not include the data for only three regions
that have not held any regional elections throughout the
period: Kemerovo province, Komi-Permyak and Evenki
autonomous districts. These autonomous districts were in
fact merged with larger territories during the period under
observation. I also excluded from this analysis the upper
chambers of regional legislative assemblies. Such chambersexisted in few regions and normally lacked political signif-
icance. For the remaining 84 regions, the study embraced 95
elections. The overall number of candidates coded for ethnic
Muslim origins was 23,902. Of them, 3196 (13.37 percent)
were identiﬁed as ethnic Muslims, and 20,706, as others. Of
course, this method does not allow to establish ethnicity
within these wide categories (it does not differentiate
between Tatars and Bashkirs, or between Russians and
Yakuts), but for drawing the lines between the categories, it
is quite efﬁcient, and this sufﬁces for the purposes of this
study.
The reason for taking December 2003 as a starting point
for my inquiry was institutional. Starting with that time,
the federal law made it imperative for the regions to elect
no less than a half of their assembly deputies by a system of
proportional representation. This makes the whole set of
G.V. Golosov / Journal of Eurasian Studies 3 (2012) 93–10598cases internally homogeneous, and the cases themselves,
comparable (Golosov, 2006), which will have especially
important consequences for the next section of this anal-
ysis. At this point, however, certain clariﬁcations regarding
the institutional framework of the observed elections are in
order. Each of the 95 elections included a proportional
component, and ten of them were held exclusively by
proportional formulas. Sverdlovsk province uses a system
of staggered elections, with a half of its assembly being
elected each two years. I counted each of these elections
separately. The average size of the elected assembly was
45.08, while the average size of the proportional part was
slightlymore than a half of that, 24.18. To understand this, it
is important to take into account that mixed-system
assemblies tended to be larger than those elected by pure
proportional systems.
Proportional elections were held exclusively in region-
wide districts. The set of legally eligible participants in
these elections was restricted to nationally registered
political parties and (up to the fall of 2005) to electoral
blocs created by them. These entities were entitled to
nominate their lists of candidates for elections. The lists,
with few exceptions, were closed, not providing for a choice
among individual candidates. In order to achieve repre-
sentation, parties were normally required to cross legal
thresholds. Of the 95 elections under observation, 10
percent thresholds were in 2, 8 percent in 1, 7 percent in 52,
6 percent in 2, 5 percent in 32, 4 percent in 3, 3 percent in 1,
and two regions did not set such thresholds. Most of these
thresholds were, as follows from the numbers, prohibi-
tively high. The non-proportional sections of regional
legislative elections were shaped in a variety of ways,
including majority, single-member plurality, and multi-
member plurality systems, and single non-transferable
vote. These differences were not very consequential from
the point of view of this study. Yet it is important to
mention that non-proportional (district) elections
remained the only outlet for independent candidacy, ofﬁ-
cially referred to as ‘self-nomination’, in Russia’s regional
electoral arenas.
The political atmosphere in which these elections were
held was not very favorable for political pluralism.
Throughout the period under observation, Russia shifted
from what can be called a manipulative ‘managed democ-
racy’ (Colton & McFaul, 2003) to electoral authoritarianism
(Golosov, 2011), with the national pro-government party,
United Russia, gradually achieving effective political
monopoly in the country. This shift was accompanied by
a move toward a greater political centralization, with
United Russia being employed as one of its principal tools
(Konitzer & Wegren, 2006). The average share of seats
taken by United Russia in 32 elections fromDecember 2003
to May 2005 was 43.40 percent, in 35 elections from
October 2005 to April 2007, 60.33 percent, and in 19 elec-
tions in December 2007 and March 2008, it achieved 74.20
percent. The consequences for ethnic Muslim representa-
tion will be discussed at some length in the following
section. Already at this point, however, the role of United
Russia is noteworthy simply because this party emerges as
the principle vehicle for any kind of political representation
in Russia.Table 3 reports factual information about the levels of
representation attained by ethnicMuslims in the December
2003–March 2008 regional legislative elections. The
regions are arranged in the descending order of the
percentage shares of their ethnic Muslim populations, as
reported in Table 2. The table also reports the percentage
shares of ethnic Muslim deputies elected to the assemblies,
and identiﬁes the ways in which these deputies were
nominated for elections (by a political party, an electoral
bloc, or as independents). The dates of elections are
provided to make a dynamic assessment possible.
The data presented in the table suggest a non-
monotonous pattern of ethnic Muslim representation in
Russia. In those regions where they form majorities of
population, ethnic Muslims are almost invariably over-
represented. Yet there is some differentiation within this
category of regions. In those republics where the ethnic
Muslims overwhelmingly exceed other ethnic groups, the
extent of their overrepresentation is modest, and in Dage-
stan, they are even slightly underrepresented. Ethnic
Muslims’ overrepresentation becomes much more visible
in the four republics where their shares in the population
vary between 53.99 and 70.50 percent, and its reaches its
apex in the only ethnic Muslim republic where the ‘titular’
nation yields plurality to Russians, Adygeya. In Adygeya,
indeed, the difference between the percentage shares of
ethnic Muslims in the assembly and the populations is
glaring 19.29 percent. Then follows a long sequence of
regions where ethnic Muslims are signiﬁcant minorities in
the overall population, from 25.59 percent in Astrakhan
province to 6.80 percent in Perm territory, and where
ethnic Muslims are invariably underrepresented. This
tendency breaks drastically at Omsk province, with its 6.75
percent of ethnic Muslims in the population and 9.09
percent, in the assembly. As the share of ethnic Muslims in
the population becomes still smaller, the pattern becomes
erratic, combining the cases of strong overrepresentation
(such as in Sverdlovsk and Sakhalin provinces) with those
of severe under-representation (such as in Moscow).
A more rigorous way to assess the pattern is to run
a bivariate analysis of relationship between ethnic
Muslims’ shares in the population and in the assemblies. To
do that, I slightly modiﬁed the data to avoid giving exces-
sive weight to those regions that held more than one
elections during the period under observation. Namely,
I simply calculated average shares of assembly seats won by
ethnic Muslim candidates in such regions, which left me
with 84 observations overall. The correlation between the
two variables on the whole set of cases proved to be very
strong, 0.98 (here and below, Pearson’s r). However, upon
the removal of top eight regions where ethnic Muslims are
overrepresented (n ¼ 76), the correlation falls to 0.61, and
after all regions where ethnic Muslims form more than 5
percent of the population are removed (n ¼ 57), Pearson’s r
becomes small and statistically insigniﬁcant, 0.20.
As follows from the table, the principle vehicle of ethnic
Muslim representation in the regions of Russia is indeed
the ‘party of power’, United Russia. This can be proven by
using a simple method of counting the numbers of nomi-
nation categories in Table 3. Of the 106 categories, United
Russia provides 48, self-nomination, 21, and the
Table 3
The representation of ethic Muslims in Russia’s regional legislative assemblies.
Region Election date Overall share of ethic
Muslims among the
deputies, percent
Ways of nomination of the Muslim deputies (percent by category,
if there is a breakdown)
Ingushetia December 7, 2003 100.00 Independents (41.18), United Russia (20.59), Russian Party of Life (14.71),
Russian Party of Peace (8.82), Yabloko (8.82), People’s Party of the Russian
Federation (5.88)
Ingushetia March 2, 2008 96.30 United Russia (70.37), Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (11.11), Communist
Party of the Russian Federation (7.41), A Just Russia (7.41)
Chechnya November 27, 2005 97.50 United Russia (57.5), Independents (22.5), Union of Right Forces (10),
Communist Party of the Russian Federation (7.5)
Dagestan March 11, 2007 93.04 United Russia (61.11), Agrarian Party of Russia (9.72), A Just Russia (8.33),
Communist Party of the Russian Federation (6.94), Patriots of Russia (6.94)
Kabardino-Balkaria December 7, 2003 77.99 United Russia (58.72), Independents (10.09), Agrarian Party of Russia (4.59),
Communist Party of the Russian Federation (4.59)
Karachevo-Cherkesia March 14, 2004 79.46 United Russia (45.21), Independents (17.81), Communist Party of the Russian
Federation (8.22), True Patriots of Russia (4.11), Liberal Democratic Party
of Russia (2.74), Russian Party of Life (1.37)
Bashkortostan March 2, 2008 60.83 United Russia (57.5), Communist Party of the Russian Federation (2.5),
Independents (0.83)
Tatarstan March 14, 2004 63.00 United Russia (54), Independents (6), Communist Party of the Russian
Federation (3)
Adygeya March 12, 2006 46.29 United Russia (22.22), Independents (12.96), Agrarian Party of Russia (7.41),
Communist Party of the Russian Federation (3.7)
Astrakhan October 8, 2006 12.28 United Russia (7.02), Independents (5.26)
Orenburg March 12, 2006 10.64 United Russia (6.38), Communist Party of the Russian Federation (2.13),
Russian Party of Life (2.13)
Khanty-Mansi AD March 12, 2006 0 None
Ulyanovsk December 7, 2003 4.17 United Russia
Ulyanovsk March 2, 2008 13.33 United Russia (10), Communist Party of the Russian Federation (3.33)
Tyumen March 11, 2007 2.94 United Russia
Chelyabinsk December 25, 2005 10.91 United Russia (9.09), A Just Russia (1.82)
Yamalo-Nenets AD March 27, 2005 5.00 United Russia
Kalmykia December 7, 2003 3.70 United Russia (3.7)
Kalmykia March 2, 2008 3.70 United Russia (3.7)
Udmurtia December 2, 2007 7.07 United Russia (5.05), Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (2.02)
Stavropol March 11, 2007 4.00 United Russia
Saratov December 2, 2007 0 None
Perm December 3, 2006 3.33 United Russia
Omsk March 11, 2007 9.09 United Russia
Marii El October 10, 2004 8.16 United Russia (6.12), Russian Pensioners Party (2.04)
Penza December 2, 2007 4.00 United Russia
Samara March 11, 2007 4.00 Communist Party of the Russian Federation
Mordovia December 7, 2003 8.51 United Russia (6.38), Independents (2.13)
Mordovia December 2, 2007 4.16 United Russia (2.08), Independents (2.08)
Kurgan November 21, 2004 6.46 United Russia (3.23), Independents (3.23)
Sverdlovsk March 14, 2004 14.29 United Russia
Sverdlovsk October 8, 2006 7.14 Russian Party of Life
Sverdlovsk March 2, 2008 14.29 United Russia
Volgograd December 7, 2003 5.26 United Russia (2.63), Independents (2.63)
Moscow City December 4, 2005 0 None
Ust-Ordynskii Buryat March 14, 2004 0 None
Kirov March 12, 2006 1.89 Agrarian Party of Russia
Tomsk March 11, 2007 4.76 United Russia
Komi March 11, 2007 0 None
Taimyr AD January 23, 2005 0 None
Krasnoyarsk April 15, 2007 0 None
Chuvashia October 8, 2006 4.55 United Russia
Magadan May 22, 2005 0 None
Sakha (Yakutia) March 2, 2008 1.47 Independents
Rostov March 2, 2008 4.00 United Russia
Novosibirsk December 11, 2005 1.02 Communist Party of the Russian Federation
Krasnodar December 2, 2007 2.86 United Russia
Murmansk March 11, 2007 0 None
Kamchatka December 2, 2007 2.00 United Russia
Sakhalin October 10, 2004 10.71 United Russia (7.14), Independents (3.57)
Irkutsk October 10, 2004 2.33 United Russia
Nizhny Novgorod March 12, 2006 2.00 Russian Party of Life
Chukotka December 25, 2005 0 None
St. Petersburg March 11, 2007 4.00 United Russia
Khakasia December 26, 2004 2.66 United Russia (1.33), Independents (1.33)
(continued on next page)
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Table 3 (continued )
Region Election date Overall share of ethic
Muslims among the
deputies, percent
Ways of nomination of the Muslim deputies (percent by category,
if there is a breakdown)
Khabarovsk December 11, 2005 0 None
Koryak December 19, 2004 0 None
Jewish AP October 8, 2006 0 None
Tver December 18, 2005 0 None
Ivanovo December 4, 2005 0 None
Ivanovo March 2, 2008 2.08 United Russia
Moscow Province March 11, 2007 2.00 Communist Party of the Russian Federation
Amur March 27, 2005 0 None
Amur March 2, 2008 2.78 United Russia
Primorsky Territory October 8, 2006 2.50 Independents
Buryatia December 2, 2007 1.54 United Russia
Chita October 24, 2004 0 None
Kaliningrad March 12, 2006 5.12 United Russia (2.56), Patriots of Russia (2.56)
Yaroslavl March 14, 2004 6.39 United Russia (4.26), Electoral Bloc Motherland (2.13)
Yaroslavl March 2, 2008 6.00 United Russia (4), Independents (2)
Leningrad March 11, 2007 2.00 United Russia
Altai Territory March 14, 2004 0 None
Altai Territory March 2, 2008 0 None
Kaluga November 14, 2004 0 None
Ryazan March 20, 2005 0 None
Orel March 11, 2007 0 None
Tula October 3, 2004 0 None
Vladimir March 20, 2005 0 None
Belgorod October 16, 2005 0 None
Nenets AD February 6, 2005 5.56 United Russia
Novgorod October 8, 2006 0 None
Kostroma December 4, 2005 0 None
Aginskii Buryat AD October 30, 2005 0 None
Karelia October 8, 2006 2.00 Independents
Voronezh March 20, 2005 0 None
Smolensk December 2, 2007 0 None
Tyva October 8, 2006 0 None
Lipetsk October 8, 2006 1.79 United Russia
Tambov December 18, 2005 2 Independents
Pskov March 11, 2007 0 None
Arkhangelsk December 19, 2004 0 None
Kursk March 12, 2006 0 None
Vologda December 7, 2003 0 None
Vologda March 11, 2007 0 None
Bryansk December 5, 2004 3.58 Electoral Bloc for Motherland, for Justice (1.79),
Independents (1.79)
Source: calculated by the author from the Russian Electoral Statistics Database, http://db.irena.org.ru/, accessed in January through 7 December 2011.
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remaining parties appears on the set more than thrice,
including the third nationally important party, the Liberal
Democratic Party of the Russian Federation. Of course, at
this point, it would be premature to make any inference
regarding the causes for United Russia’s apparent cham-
pionship in providing ethnic Muslims with assembly seats.
It well might be that the reason is simply the party’s
domination in the general electorate.
4. Patterns of ethnic Muslim representation: an
explanation
One explanation of why ethnic Muslims are over-
represented in some regions and underrepresented in
others, as observed above, is easily at hand, general and
parsimonious, but not very helpful. To put it brieﬂy, terri-
torially dispersed minorities tend to be underrepresented
under any electoral system. This would be the case with
Russians in Ingushetia and Chechnya, and with ethnic
Muslims in some of the regions of central Russia. But thisdoes not explain neither the overrepresentation of ethnic
Muslims in Adygeya, on the one hand, and in Bryansk
province, on the other hand, nor their under-representation
in Orenburg province.
The second theory, also easily available at the scholarly
marketplace, would be to relate the overrepresentation of
ethnic Muslims to their status of ‘titular nationalities’ in
some of the republics. One of the goals of Leninist nation-
ality politics was to create local elites capable of imple-
menting the policies of the Communist party in the
Muslim-majority regions (Zaslavsky, 1993: 29–42). This
goal was generally achieved. Moreover, when the
Communist party rule collapsed, thus created elites have
managed to keep and consolidate their powers, which
allows some observers to estimate some of the republics as
‘ethnocracies’ (Kahn, 2002). Ethnicity is an important
component of the ‘politicalmachines’ built by those elites in
order to hold their grasp on the electorate (Hale, 2003). This
theory seems to be correct in that it convincingly explains
the gap between the top nine regions on Table 3, yet the
details aremissing. Why is the overrepresentation of ethnic
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comparison to Kabardino-Balkaria and Bashkortostan?
The third theory could be built on the basis of prelim-
inary ﬁndings reported in the previous section of this
article. If the role of United Russia in securing the repre-
sentation of ethnic Muslims is so well pronounced, then it
could be that this party, by building a sort of alliance with
the Muslim communities of Russia, provides them with
shortcuts to representation. Other policy-based explana-
tions can be also suggested. But for these explanations
to be correct or not, they have to be weighted against the
empirical evidence. The only way to analytically isolate
United Russia’s role in providing ethnic Muslims’ repre-
sentation from its generally superior electoral perfor-
mance is, of course, to look more closely not at the actual
level of representation, but rather at the potential
for ethnic Muslim representation provided by different
parties.
The necessary and sufﬁcient data for such analysis
were provided by including into my study not only the
elected deputies, but also all candidates running in
regional legislative elections. Yet to substantiate the
analysis, a brief overview of Russia’s party system during
the period under observation is in order. The set of
parties available for electoral participation in Russia was
established by the Law on political parties, according to
which to be ofﬁcially registered, an organization had to
fulﬁll a number of requirements to its membership and
territorial spread. These requirements grew stronger over
time, as a result of which the overall number of parties
declined from 46 in 2003 to 15 in 2007, and the overall
shape of the party system changed from the multiparty
format to a hierarchy centered around the ‘party of
power’ (Gel’man, 2008). The most sustainable and
omnipresent actors throughout the period were, in
addition to United Russia (UR), the Communist party of
the Russian Federation (CPRF) and the misleadingly
named Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR),
a personalistic vehicle of Vladimir Zhirinovsky who often
displayed statist and sometimes, nationalist inclinations.
Three parties that were also nationalist but perhaps with
a stronger emphasis on the ethno-nationalist outlook
were Motherland, the Patriots of Russia (PR), and People’s
Will (PW), later renamed as People’s Union (PU). The
moderate left was represented by the Agrarian Party of
Russia (APR), the Russian Party of Life (RPL), Russian
Pensioners’ Party (RPP), the People’s Party of the Russian
Federation (PPRF), and the Party of Russia’s Rebirth (PRR).
In 2006, Motherland, RPL and RPP merged to form a new
pro-government left-wing party, A Just Russia (AJR). The
pro-democracy segment of Russia’s political spectrum
was represented by the Union of Right Forces (URF) and
Yabloko. Before the fall of 2005, an important role in
regional electoral arenas was played by electoral blocs,
many of which were formally established by minor
national parties yet in fact sought to mobilize the local
sentiment of the electorate (Golosov, 2006). The Law on
political parties explicitly prohibits religious identities as
bases for forming political parties. However, one minor
party, the True Patriots of Russia (TPR), did in fact seek
the support of ethnic Muslims in the 2003 nationallegislative elections, and a continued to exist for some
time in 2004.
Table 4 uses as the empirical indicator of ethnic
Muslims’ representation the percentage shares of ethnic
Muslim candidates on the lists of political parties. First,
I report averages for all parties. For three parties that
participated in regional legislative elections systematically,
UR, LDPR, and CPRF, the percentages are reported sepa-
rately. All other parties are broken into two categories,
those on whose lists ethnic Muslins were overrepresented
relative to the reported average for the given region, and
those on whose lists they were underrepresented. Self-
nomination is disregarded because my primary interest at
this point is in the relationships between ethnic Muslim
populations and organized political actors.
With the data at hand, it is possible to analyze the
patterns of ethnic Muslim representation more closely.
First, it becomes clear that while United Russia does indeed
provide for their representation (on the average, the share
of ethnic Muslims on its lists is 10.07), two other major
parties, the Communists and the LDPR, are not crucially
different in this respect (the respective percentage shares
are 10.07 and 9.01). In the Muslim-majority republics of
North Caucasus, the ‘titular’ population tends to be over-
represented on the lists of all major parties. In Tatarstan
and Bashkortostan, the LDPR is an exception, yet in these
regions the party’s electoral appeal is limited, and it seems
that it gains nothing by giving more space on its lists to the
non-Muslim populations. Thus in general, it would be fair
to say that the political elites of the republics, be it United
Russia or opposition parties, are not divided along the line
of securing primary representation for ethnic Muslims. Yet
at the same time, all major parties give space to the non-
Muslim minorities too.
One exception from this generally uniform picture is
Karachevo-Cherkesia, the only republic where elections
were contested by the True Patriots of Russia, the party of
a primarily Muslim voting base. The TPR nominated a list
that was entirely Muslim by composition, and it crossed
the 5 percent threshold, thus achieving representation.
This partly explains the overall overrepresentation of
ethnic Muslims in the parliament of the republic, given
that United Russia nominated a list that almost mirrored
the actual ethnic balance in the republic. It has to be
noticed that the electoral assault of the TPR was viewed
extremely unfavorably not only by the authorities of the
republic but also by the Kremlin, and soon after these
elections the party was deprived of its ofﬁcial status and
ceased to exist.
Of course, Adygeya is exceptional in that while being
a republic, it has Russians as a large plurality of its pop-
ulation. Since, however, the incentives to keep the ‘titular’
population overrepresented remain the same as in other
republics, this opens way to politicizing the issues of ethnic
representation. In the 2006 elections in Adygeya, the
overrepresentation of ethnic Muslims on the list of United
Russia was indeed striking, yet the Communists and
another regionally important party, the APR, also nomi-
nated lists that overrepresented them. The cause of
providing ethnic non-Muslims with adequate representa-
tion was taken by a minor party that allied itself with the
Table 4
Ethnic Muslims on the lists of political parties in regional legislative elections.
Regions (year of elections,
if more than one)
Shares of ethnic Muslims on party lists, percent
Average UR CPRF LDPR Parties of ethnic Muslim
overrepresentation
Parties of ethnic Muslim
under-representation
Ingushetia (2003) 100 100 N/a N/a PPRF, Russian Party of Peace, RPL,
Yabloko (100)
None
Ingushetia (2008) 99.36 97.44 100 100 AJR (100) None
Chechnya 99.38 100 100 100 Eurasian Union, PW,
Motherland, URF (100)
Yabloko (95.00)
Dagestan 93.89 91.72 92.65 94.52 PR (95.97), APR (95.87) AJR (92.62)
Kabardino-Balkaria 76.73 73.08 79.25 N/a RPL (90.00), APR (78.18), URF (77.59) PRR (62.3)
Karachevo-Cherkesia 74.82 64.71 68.97 93.75 TPR (100), RPL (80.00) Electoral Bloc of Yabloko and the
Industrial Party (62.50), Conservative
Party of Russia (53.85)
Bashkortostan 47.36 65.54 57.35 26.39 None AJR (40.17)




RPL (54.54), URF (50.00)
Party of Russia’s Regions (43.75),
Development of Enterpise (33.33)
Adygeya 33.97 55.26 37.14 20.83 Party of Social Protection
(54.54), APR (50.00)
RPL (27.27), RPP (26.67), Russian
United Industrial Party (0)
Astrakhan 13.41 16.42 13.11 12.12 PW (21.88), PR (17.39),
Motherland (16.07),
Republican Party of the Russian
Federation (15.38)
PPRF (11.76), RPP (6.98), Democratic
Party of Russia (2.94)
Orenburg 8.13 10.00 17.24 3.85 RPP (12.00), RPL (10.34) Yabloko (7.41), PR (4.17), APR (0)
Khanty-Mansi AD 4.85 0 12.50 11.76 None RPP, URF (0)
Ulyanovsk (2003) 11.35 10.00 10.53 13.33 URF (25.00), APR (23.53),
Electoral Bloc Ulyanovsk (12.50)
Electoral Bloc People for
Frolych (7.14), PPRF (5.88),
Yabloko (5.56), Electoral Bloc
Communists (0)
Ulyanovsk (2008) 8.64 4.76 10.53 5.00 AJR (14.29) None
Tyumen 11.55 3.13 10.00 5.26 Democratic Party of Russia (25.00),
RKRP (20.00)
AJR (5.88)
Chelyabinsk 6.84 9.68 7.89 3.57 Motherland (13.79), Yabloko (10.00) URF (2.94), Social Democratic
Party of Russia (0)
Yamalo-Nenets AD 8.33 8.33 25.00 N/a None Motherland, URF (0)
Kalmykia (2003) 2.61 11.76 0 0 Party of Social Justice (14.29) APR, PRR, Russian Party of Peace,
The Greens, URF, Yabloko (0)
Kalmykia (2008) 0.56 3.33 0 0 None APR, The Greens, AJR (0)
Udmurtia 7.20 8.08 7.29 12.82 None PR (5.26), AJR (2.56)
Stavropol 6.19 5.88 7.69 6.25 URF (11.11) AJR (0)
Saratov 4.13 3.13 4.44 8.33 AJR (4.76) Yabloko (0)
Perm 2.13 5.45 0 0 RPP (5.26), APR (3.23), URF (3.13) PR, Motherland (0)
Omsk 2.13 5.00 2.78 0 PR (7.14) PW, AJR, URF (0)
Marii El 8.87 8.89 5.88 3.70 APR (18.75) RPP (7.14)
Penza 7.98 3.33 0 28.57 None AJR (0)
Samara 5.51 3.13 5.41 5.88 URF (10.00), PR (6.90) The Greens (3.85), AJR (3.45)
Mordovia (2003) 3.60 4.20 0 N/a RPL (4.88), URF (5.32) None
Mordovia (2007) 5.28 4.31 3.80 5.49 AJR (7.53) None
Kurgan 4.86 3.03 6.25 5.88 RPL (7.14), Motherland (6.25) APR (3.84), URF (3.57), RPP (2.94)
Sverdlovsk (2004) 4.21 23.08 7.14 0 PRR (7.69) APR, Free Russia, Electoral Bloc
Motherland, RPL, Electoral Bloc
of State Employees (0)
Sverdlovsk (2006) 2.76 0 0 5.56 PR (15.38), RPL (6.67) Free Russia, PW, RPP, Motherland,
Yabloko (0)
Sverdlovsk (2008) 5.64 9.09 9.09 10 None Citizens’ Force, AJR (0)
Volgograd 4.06 4.35 0 0 PRR (20.0) URF, Yabloko (0)
Moscow City 1.72 0 2.70 2.17 Party of Social Justice (4.44),
Free Russia (3.85), RPL (2.27)
PW, The Greens, Yabloko (0)
Ust-Ordynskii Buryat 9.26 6.67 10.00 11.11 None None
Kirov 1.73 0 0 0 RPL (10.00), APR (5.56) PR, Party of Social Justice, RPP,
Yabloko (0)
Tomsk 1.86 4.76 5.56 4.55 None Unity, PR, AJR, URF, Yabloko (0)
Komi 0 0 0 0 None PU, AJR, URF, Yabloko (0)
Taimyr AD 1.82 0 N/a 0 Electoral Bloc For Beloved
Taimyr (9.09)
PPRF (0)
Krasnoyarsk 0.87 2.08 4.00 0 None Democratic Party of Russia,
Socialist United Party of Russia,
AJR, URF (0)
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Regions (year of elections,
if more than one)
Shares of ethnic Muslims on party lists, percent
Average UR CPRF LDPR Parties of ethnic Muslim
overrepresentation
Parties of ethnic Muslim
under-representation
Chuvashia 2.54 2.78 0 5.56 Motherland (4.35) PR (0)
Magadan 1.56 0 6.25 0 None RPP (0)
Rostov 1.14 4.55 0 0 None AJR (0)
Sakha (Yakutia) 0.89 0 0 0 AJR (4.44) APR (0)
Novosibirsk 2.04 0 6.12 2.04 URF (4.08), Motherland (2.04) APR, PW (0)
Krasnodar 1.94 2.78 0 5.00 None AJR (0)
Murmansk 2.54 0 5.26 0 Yabloko (10) PR, AJR (0)
Kamchatka 0.47 0 1.89 0 None PR (0)
Sakhalin 2.78 10.53 0 0 RPP (7.14), Citizens’ Party of
Russia (6.67),
Yabloko (6.25)
Electoral Bloc For the Life of Dignity,
Electoral Bloc Our Motherland Is
Sakhalin, RPL, The Greens, Electoral
Bloc Union of Patriots of Sakhalin (0)
Irkutsk 2.25 4.17 0 0 Yabloko (11.11), APR (5.00) Electoral Bloc For the Beloved Angara
Land, RPP, Socialist United Party of
Russia, Motherland (0)
Nizhny Novgorod 1.36 0 4.17 4.00 None RPL, RPP, URF (0)
Chukotka 0 0 N/a 0 None None
St. Petersburg 1.92 5.77 1.89 1.96 None AJR (1.89), PR, URF (0)
Khakasia 0.66 2.78 0 0 Electoral Bloc Khakasia (2.50) APR, RPP, Motherland, URF (0)
Khabarovsk 0 0 0 0 None RPL, Motherland, URF (0)
Koryak 0 0 0 0 None RPP (0)
Jewish AP 0 0 0 0 None RPL, RPP, Motherland (0)
Tver 1.24 0 4.35 0 RPL (5.56) APR, PW, Motherland (0)
Ivanovo (2005) 2.19 0 0 5 RPP (12.50) PR, Russian United Industrial Party,
Motherland, URF (0)
Ivanovo (2008) 0.95 0 0 4.76 0 AJR, URF (0)
Moscow Province 0.81 0 2.00 1.56 AJR (2.08) PR, URF, Yabloko (0)
Amur (2005) 0 0 0 0 None APR, Electoral Bloc For the Beloved
Amur Land, Electoral Bloc We Are
For the Development of Amur
Province, RPP, Motherland, URF (0)
Amur (2008) 0.41 2.04 0 0 None AJR, Party of Peace and Unity (0)
Primorsky Territory 0.67 0 0 0 PR (6.67) PW, RPL, RPP, Freedom and People’s
Power, Motherland, Yabloko (0)
Buryatia 1.28 2 3.13 0 None AJR (0)
Chita 1.82 9.09 0 0 None APR,Yabloko (0)
Kaliningrad 1.42 2.50 1.89 0 PR (2.86), Russian Party of Peace (2.7) RPP, Yabloko (0)
Yaroslavl (2004) 1.39 8.33 0 0 Electoral Bloc Motherland (5.56) APR, Electoral Bloc Truth – Order
– Justice, The Greens, RPL, Yabloko (0)
Yaroslavl (2008) 3.47 0 5.56 0 APR (11.11), PR (11.11) Citizens’ Force, PU, The Greens (0)
Leningrad 1.11 0 2.17 2.33 URF (2.17) PR, AJR (0)
Altai Territory (2004) 0.36 0 2.17 0 None Electoral Bloc in Support of the
President, Unity, Electoral Bloc of
Yabloko and URF (0)
Altai Territory (2008) 0 0 0 0 None AJR (0)
Kaluga 1.04 0 6.25 0 None APR, Motherland, Yabloko (0)
Ryazan 1.34 0 0 4.35 Electoral Bloc For Ryazan
Territory (5.00)
Electoral Bloc Social Protection
and Justice, Motherland, URF (0)
Orel 0 0 0 0 None Democratic Party of Russia, PW,
PR, AJR, URF (0)
Tula 0.69 0 0 7.69 None Electoral Bloc People’s Voice for
the Motherland, Electoral Bloc
Frontier – Motherland Party,
Electoral Bloc For Tula Territory,
PPRF, RPP, The Greens, URF,
Electoral Bloc Union For Social
Justice (0)
Vladimir 0.60 0 4.17 0 None APR, Electoral Bloc Vladimir
Citizens’ Union, RPL, RPP (0)
Belgorod 0.71 0 0 5.00 None APR, Electoral Bloc Patriots of
Russia – Patriots of Bryansk Land,
RPL, Motherland (0)
Nenets AD 2.40 7.69 0 9.09 None Electoral Bloc For Our District,
RPP, Motherland, URF (0)
Novgorod 0 0 0 0 None Free Russia, Democratic Party of
Russia, PW, PR, RPL, Motherland (0)
Kostroma 1.09 0 4.17 0 RPL (4.55) APR, PW, Motherland, URF (0)
(continued on next page)
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Table 4 (continued )
Regions (year of elections,
if more than one)
Shares of ethnic Muslims on party lists, percent
Average UR CPRF LDPR Parties of ethnic Muslim
overrepresentation
Parties of ethnic Muslim
under-representation
Aginskii Buryat AD 0 0 0 0 None None
Karelia 0.65 0 0 0 PR (4.55) PU, RPP, RPL (0)
Voronezh 0.31 0 0 0 PW (2.78) RPL, RPP, Motherland, Electoral
Bloc Justice, Electoral Bloc of URF
and Yabloko (0)
Smolensk 1.02 0 1.96 2.12 None AJR (0)
Tyva 0.76 0 0 4.55 None PR, RPL, Motherland (0)
Lipetsk 1.19 3.33 0 3.23 RPL (4.00) Democratic Party of Russia, PW,
PR, RPP (0)
Tambov 0.83 0 0 0 Freedom and People’s Power (9.09) APR, Unity, Republican Party of
the Russian Federation, RPL, RPP,
Motherland, Yabloko (0)
Pskov 0.58 0 0 0 SEPR (2.22), PR (1.85) DPR, AJR (0)
Arkhangelsk 1.26 0 0 0 PRR (5.71), Party of Social
Justice (2.86), APR (2.78)
Electoral Bloc Our Motherland Is
Arkhangelsk Province, Electoral
Bloc Northern Territory, Motherland (0)
Kursk 0.54 0 2.33 0 URF (2.56) APR, Democratic Party of Russia,
PR, RPL, RPP (0)
Vologda (2003) 1.36 0 0 0 URF (4.17), APR (4.00) PRR (0)
Vologda (2007) 1.42 3.51 0 0 APR (1.79) None
Bryansk 1.46 0 0 0 Electoral Bloc for the Rebirth
of Bryansk Land (7.69), Electoral
Bloc for Motherland, Electoral
Bloc For Justice (4.0)
PRR, Motherland, URF (0)
Source: calculated by the author from the Russian Electoral Statistics Database, http://db.irena.org.ru/, accessed in January through 7 December 2011.
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Party. The party took 12.92 percent of party list vote, which
brought its leaders to the assembly. True, the combined
vote for United Russia, the Communists, and the Agrarians
was massive enough to leave ethnic Muslims strongly
overrepresented. Yet the unexpected entry of the Russian
United Industrial Party into the electoral arena of the
republic caused signiﬁcant turmoil and anger among the
region’s predominantly Adygeyan political elites, as testi-
ﬁed by the fact that the president of Adygeya lost his power
amidst the turmoil.
The experiences of Karachaevo-Cherkesia and Adygeya,
however different, jointly point to an important commu-
nality in the political lives of the republics with ethnic
Muslim ‘titular’ populations. The preferred mode of oper-
ation for their ethnocratic elites is to keep political domi-
nance by securing the overrepresentation of ethic Muslims
in all electorally important parties without placing the
related issues high on the agenda of regional elections. Any
attempts to elevate these issues, be it in the direction of
mobilizing the Muslim vote (as in Karachaevo-Cherkesia)
or in the direction of non-Muslim interest advocacy (as in
Adygeya), are viewed as undesirable.
As I have already observed in the previous section of this
analysis, an entirely different pattern of ethnic Muslim
under-representation can be found in a relatively large
group of regions with signiﬁcant ethnic Muslim pop-
ulations that are not republics. Now it becomes clear that in
these regions, major parties rarely sought to increase its
electoral appeal by mobilizing the ethnic Muslim vote.
In the regions with largest ethnic Muslim minorities,
Astrakhan and Orenburg provinces and Khanty-Mansi
autonomous district, ethnic Muslims were actually under-
represented on the lists of all parties, the Communist partyin Orenburg standing as the only (but not very salient)
exception. In Ulyanovsk and Tyumen provinces, there were
lists with very signiﬁcant shares of ethnic Muslim candi-
dates, such as the URF list in Ulyanovsk (2003) and the
Democratic Party of Russia list in Tyumen. Yet these lists
failed to cross the established thresholds of representation,
and no such attempts can be found in regions with smaller
shares of ethnic Muslims within this category. However, as
the share of ethnic Muslims in the general population goes
down, the major parties – primarily, United Russia and the
CPRF, but sometimes even the LDPR, as in Udmurtia, – start
to place certain numbers of ethnic Muslims on their lists. As
demonstrated above, this gradually reverses the pattern of
ethnic Muslim under-representation.
At the ﬁrst glance, such dynamics may seem idiosyn-
cratic. It seems unclear why important political parties
disregard the possibility of mobilizing the Muslim vote in
those regions where Muslims are numerous enough to
bring a signiﬁcant bonus, and start to appeal to them only
they decrease in numbers. I believe that this pattern is, in
fact, well consistent with the general logic of proportional
representation. Appeals to minorities pay off to major
parties only if by making such appeals, they do not risk to
limit their attractiveness for the general population. Yet
with relatively large minorities, such risks are greater than
with relatively small ones simply because of the differen-
tiated salience of ethnic and cultural divisions. In other
words, party elites are likely to appeal to minorities only if
the cleavages between these minorities and majorities are
not likely to be politicized. But they are more likely to be
politicized if the minority is relatively large.
Hence a very miscellaneous picture of ethnic Muslim
representation in the regions where there are few ethnic
Muslims. In these regions, access to representation
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to enter locally prominent political parties, primarily
United Russia. Such alliances aremademostly on individual
bases, but this does not exclude the whole groups of ethnic
Muslim politicians to be included, as, for instance, with the
Pensioners’ Party in Ivanovo province (2005). But it is clear
that under such conditions, what really matters in terms of
representation is placement on the list of United Russia.
Hence its prominence in delivering representation to Rus-
sia’s ethnic Muslims.
5. Conclusion
This analysis reveals that the overall pattern of the
representation of ethnic Muslims in Russia’s regional legis-
lative assemblies is not monotonous. Ethnic Muslims are
signiﬁcantly overrepresented in those republics where they
are ‘titular’ nationalities; they tend to be underrepresented
in a group of regions with signiﬁcant ethnic Muslim
minorities; but as their share in the overall population goes
down, the picture becomes more balanced, so that it would
be fair to say that small Muslim minorities are quite well
represented. Despite this apparent variation, the underlying
logic is the same for all types of regions, and if put most
brieﬂy, this is the logic of non-politicization of cleavages. For
the ruling elites of Muslim-majority republics, the preferred
mode of operation is to keep the overrepresentation of
Muslims as a characteristic of all political groups who can
realistically claim access to power. For the predominantly
Russian elites of regions with signiﬁcant ethnic Muslim
minorities, the non-politicization of cleavages is a way to
make electoral appeals to wider general population. In the
regionswith small ethnicMuslimminorities, their entry into
political arenas is conditional on individual or group alli-
ances with locally dominant elite groups, without any
articulation of ethnicity/religion cleavages whatsoever.
Then it is not surprising that after the True Patriots of
Russia perished, no political partymade an attempt to enter
the theoretically promising electoral niche of mobilizing
the ethnic Muslim vote. Quite the reverse is true, the
cleavage is progressively downplayed in the rhetoric of all
parties. It is striking to note that even those parties that are
generally considered as Russian nationalist, such as the
LDPR or Motherland, in some regions recruited signiﬁcant
numbers of ethnic Muslims on their lists.
The problem is that this situation may be not sustainable
in the long run. In fact, one of the aspects of the growing
electoral authoritarianism inRussia is that it has succeeded in
eliminating almost all issue content from the arena of elec-
toral politics. The issues of ethnicityare not exceptional in this
respect. The same applies to the issues of class, fundamental
economic policies and the like. If, however, the system of
electoral authoritarianism gives way to a more competitive
model of politics, all currently suppressed issues will resur-
face overnight. If this is to happen, then we already know
which regions are likely to be in trouble with the represen-
tation of ethnicMuslims:ﬁrst, those republicswhere they are
overrepresented (which applies to Kabardino-Balkaria, Kar-
achaevo-Cherkesia, Bashkortostan, Tatarstan, and especiallyAdygeya); and second, those regions where they are under-
represented (which applies primarily to Asdtrakhan, Oren-
burg, Ulyanovsk, and Tyumen provinces).Acknowledgments
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